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Before BRISCOE, Chief Judge, BALDOCK and HOLMES, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff-Appellant Terry Latham appeals the district court’s order granting 
summary judgment to Defendant-Appellee Board of Education of the 
Albuquerque Public Schools (“APS”) on Ms. Latham’s claim for an alleged 
violation of the New Mexico Human Rights Act (“NMHRA”). Ms. Latham 
worked as a substitute teacher in APS for approximately fifteen years, ending in 
late 2008. In that year, APS ordered Ms. Latham to stop bringing her registered 
service dog, “Bandit,” to school with her during her teaching assignments. APS
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the 
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, 
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Federal Rule of Appellate 
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denied Ms. Latham’s subsequent, formal request to continue bringing Bandit to 
school. Claiming that Bandit’s presence was a substantial aid to her health in 
light of her chronic asthma, and that APS’s denial was a violation of her rights 
under state and federal law, Ms. Latham sued APS. The district court entered 
summary judgment in favor of APS, and Ms. Latham filed this timely appeal. 
Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm the judgment of the 
district court.
I
Ms. Latham suffers from asthma. She worked for APS as a substitute 
teacher for approximately fifteen years. From January to May 2008, Ms. Latham 
brought Bandit, her registered service dog, to school with her during her teaching 
assignments. According to APS, it first became aware that Ms. Latham was 
bringing Bandit to school in March 2008. After initially issuing a plan allowing 
Ms. Latham to bring Bandit to work, APS rescinded the plan and directed Ms. 
Latham not to bring Bandit.
In June 2008, Ms. Latham filed a discrimination charge against APS with 
the New Mexico Human Rights Division. On December 5, 2008, the Division 
issued a “Determination of Probable Cause” that APS had discriminated against 
Ms. Latham based on her disability. Three days later, APS suspended Ms. 
Latham for one week for bringing Bandit to work.
Ms. Latham filed suit against APS in New Mexico state court alleging
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discrimination and retaliation, in violation of the NMHRA; the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213; the Rehabilitation Act, 29 
U.S.C. §§ 701-796l; and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. APS removed the case to federal 
court, and then moved for summary judgment on the discrimination claims. The 
district court noted that claims of discrimination under the ADA and 
Rehabilitation Act involve identical inquiries. Contrary to Ms. Latham’s 
averments, the court determined that the standards of the ADA Amendments Act 
of 2008 (“ADAAA”) were not applicable. The ADAAA was enacted on 
September 25, 2008, and became effective on January 1, 2009. See ADAAA,
Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 8, 122 Stat. 3553, 3559 (2008) (“This Act and the 
amendments made by this Act shall become effective on January 1, 2009.”). 
Because the alleged violations in this case took place in 2008, and because, in the 
district court’s view, the ADAAA is not applicable retroactively, the court made 
its summary judgment determinations based on the pre-amendment ADA.
The district court concluded, based on its review of the evidence in the 
record, that Ms. Latham is not disabled under the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act. 
It granted summary judgment on the ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims for that 
reason, and granted summary judgment on the § 1983 claim because no 
discrimination could be found absent the demonstration of a disability. On the 
NMHRA state-law claim, the district court determined that New Mexico courts 
apply the same standards set forth in the ADA. Accordingly, having determined
-3-
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that Ms. Latham is not disabled under the ADA, the district court found that she 
is not disabled under the NMHRA.
The district court granted APS’s motion in full, stating that Ms. Latham had 
“failed to provide evidence that she is disabled under the Rehabilitation Act, the 
ADA, or the NMHRA.” Aplt. App. at 175 (Mem. Op. & Order, filed Sept. 21, 
2010). On appeal, Ms. Latham challenges only the district court’s adverse ruling 
regarding her NMHRA claim.
II
A
We review the district court’s order granting summary judgment de novo, 
and we draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party—in this 
case, Ms. Latham. See Trentadue v. Integrity Comm., 501 F.3d 1215, 1226 (10th 
Cir. 2007). “[S]ummary judgment is appropriate ‘if the movant shows that there 
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.’” Morris v. City of Colo. Springs, 666 F.3d 654, 660 
(10th Cir. 2012) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)).1 
1 Ms. Latham contends that we should adopt New Mexico’s practice of 
“view[ing] summary judgment with disfavor, preferring a trial on the merits.” 
Romero v. Philip Morris, Inc., 242 P.3d 280, 287 (N.M. 2010). Asserting that 
“New Mexico courts consider summary judgment to be nothing short of a drastic 
remedy to be used only with great caution,” Aplt. Reply Br. at 2 (citing 
Pharmaseal Labs., Inc. v. Goffe, 568 P.2d 589, 592 (N.M. 1977)), Ms. Latham 
contends that “[t]his Court should review this case with that . . . state interest in
(continued...)
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B
On appeal, Ms. Latham avers for the first time that the district court should 
have followed an NMHRA-specific standard when evaluating her qualification for 
protection under that state statute. Specifically, she states that “the district court 
followed the wrong standard,” Aplt. Opening Br. at 10, and that “[t]he district 
court should have recognized [that] the issue is not whether Ms. Latham is 1
1 (...continued)
mind, and regard summary judgment as would a New Mexico state court,” id. at 
3.
Ms. Latham’s argument—that we should emulate the New Mexico state 
courts by following their summary-judgment standards—fails for at least two 
reasons. First, it is waived because she presents it for the first time in her 
appellate reply brief. See, e.g., Stump v. Gates, 211 F.3d 527, 533 (10th Cir. 
2000) (“This court does not ordinarily review issues raised for the first time in a 
reply brief.”). Second, even if we were to reach the substance of the argument, 
we would conclude that it is wholly without merit and foreclosed by controlling 
precedent. Specifically, federal law is the source of the operative summary 
judgment standard, even when addressing a state-law claim. See, e.g., Milne v. 
USA Cycling, Inc., 575 F.3d 1120, 1129 (10th Cir. 2009) (“[A]lthough we will 
look to Utah law to determine what elements the plaintiffs must prove at trial to 
prevail on their claims, we will look exclusively to federal law to determine 
whether plaintiffs have provided enough evidence on each of those elements to 
withstand summary judgment.” (citation omitted)); Foster v. Alliedsignal, Inc., 
293 F.3d 1187, 1194-95 (10th Cir. 2002) (“[A] federal court sitting in diversity 
will be guided by federal-law standards governing summary judgment 
procedure.”); see also Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 473-74 (1965) (“To hold 
that a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure must cease to function whenever it alters 
the mode of enforcing state-created rights would be to disembowel either the 
Constitution’s grant of power over federal procedure or Congress’ attempt to 
exercise that power in the Enabling Act.”); cf. Flood v. ClearOne Commc’ns.
Inc., 618 F.3d 1110, 1117 (10th Cir. 2010) (noting that “federal law governs the 
procedural questions when a preliminary injunction may issue and what standards 
of review we apply”).
-5-
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disabled, but whether she has a serious medical condition,” id. at 12 (emphasis 
added). But before the district court, Ms. Latham was not simply mute when it 
came to the standard that the district court should employ when analyzing the 
NMHRA claim—she explicitly used the ADA standard for “disability” as a plug­
in for the NMHRA. See, e.g., Aplt. App. at 106 (Resp. to Mot. for Summ. J., 
filed June 8, 2010) (“[B]ecause Congress has fixed the ADA, the New Mexico 
Supreme Court would follow the new version [of the ADA].”).
Because Ms. Latham argued before the district court that a version of the 
federal ADA standard applied to her NMHRA claim—rather than an allegedly 
distinct state-law standard—her new argument on appeal that a different, state- 
law standard applies is waived.2 We therefore do not reach the merits of the 
argument. Nor do we reach Ms. Latham’s contention that, if  the “serious medical 
condition” standard were applied, there would be disputed issues of material fact
2 Even if Ms. Latham’s argument is not waived because she 
affirmatively relied upon a federal ADA standard—rather than a state-law 
standard—before the district court, we still decline to consider it for another 
reason. Because Ms. Latham never raised the “serious medical condition” theory, 
in any form, before the district court, her argument on appeal is forfeited. See 
Richison v. Ernest Grp., Inc., 634 F.3d 1123, 1128 (10th Cir. 2011) (“[I]f the 
theory . . . wasn’t raised before the district court, we usually hold it forfeited.”). 
Ms. Latham does not argue for plain-error review, and “the failure to argue for 
plain error . . . surely marks the end of the road for an argument for reversal not 
first presented to the district court,” id. at 1131. “[Even if a party’s] arguments 
were merely forfeited before the district court, [the] failure to explain . . . how 
they survive the plain error standard waives the arguments in this court.” 
McKissick v. Yuen, 618 F.3d 1177, 1189 (10th Cir. 2010).
-6-
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that would preclude summary judgment under the NMHRA.
C
Ms. Latham claims that the district court proceeded improperly by 
“considering] Ms. Latham’s medical evidence,” and “then weigh[ing] it and 
[finding] it insufficient to support a determination that she is disabled.” Aplt. 
Opening Br. at 13. While it is correct that in summary-judgment determinations, 
the court does “not weigh the evidence or make credibility determinations,” Utah 
Lighthouse Ministry v. Found. for Apologetic Info. & Research, 527 F.3d 1045, 
1050 (10th Cir. 2008), Ms. Latham’s argument is misguided.
The true gravamen of her concern appears to be that the court actually 
considered the summary judgment record, without blindly accepting her bald 
averments. The pages of the district court’s decision that Ms. Latham alleges 
support her claim, see Aplt. Opening Br. at 13, clearly reflect the court’s 
“[c]areful review of the evidence.” Aplt. App. at 170. The district court 
determined that APS was entitled to summary judgment because the evidence that 
Ms. Latham produced fell short of satisfying the factual predicates for her claim. 
In particular, the court noted that “Ms. Latham has advanced no evidence 
demonstrating that her asthma is severe.” Id. at 168; see id. (“Ms. Latham has not 
presented any evidence regarding the nature or severity of her impairment.”).
The court refused to rely on Ms. Latham’s bald assertions to validate her claim 
that her medical condition qualified her for relief under the NMHRA. See id. at
-7-
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168 n.1 (“The Court . . . cannot conclude based on Ms. Latham’s unsupported 
assertions that her condition constitutes severe as opposed to mild asthma.” 
(emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted)); id. at 168 (noting that “Ms. 
Latham admitted in her deposition that no doctor has diagnosed her with severe 
asthma” and that she had relied instead on her own assessment of her condition).
The district court’s approach here reflects a sound understanding of its 
obligations in the summary judgment context. On summary judgment, a district 
court is tasked with reviewing the record (or at least those portions of the record 
cited by the parties). It is not required to credit a nonmovant’s bald assertions 
marshaled in favor of her claim—like Ms. Latham’s assertions here. A 
nonmovant is entitled only to the reasonable inferences arising from the evidence. 
See White v. YorkInt’l Corp., 45 F.3d 357, 360 (10th Cir. 1995) (“The very 
purpose of a summary judgment action is to determine whether trial is necessary. 
Thus, the nonmoving party must, at a minimum, direct the court to facts which 
establish a genuine issue for trial.”); accord Bennett v. Saint-Gobain Corp., 507 
F.3d 23, 30 (1st Cir. 2007) (“In an employment discrimination case, a plaintiff’s 
ability to survive summary judgment depends on his ability to muster facts 
sufficient to support an inference of discrimination. He cannot rely exclusively on 
bald assertions, unsupported conclusions, or optimistic surmises.” (emphasis 
added)); see also T&MDistrib., Inc. v. United States, 185 F.3d 1279, 1285 (Fed. 
Cir. 1999) (noting that plaintiff “cannot defeat summary judgment and obtain
-8-
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discovery with just bald assertions and speculation of wrongful conduct”); cf. 
Salehpoor v. Shahinpoor, 358 F.3d 782, 786 (10th Cir. 2004) (“Reference to 
facial assertions in a complaint are not sufficient to overcome Rule 56 summary 
judgment when the record as a whole reveals that there is no genuine issue of 
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”). 
Accordingly, we reject Ms. Latham’s contention that the district court erred in 
applying the governing summary judgment standards.
D
1
The parties agree that all events relevant to Ms. Latham’s claim took place 
in 2008. Nevertheless, Ms. Latham avers that the district court erred by 
not analyzing her state-law claim under the ADAAA—the ADA as amended, with 
a January 1, 2009, effective date. She claims that the “New Mexico Supreme 
Court would look [to the ADAAA] for guidance when construing the NMHRA,” 
Aplt. Opening Br. at 16, even though all conduct related to that NMHRA claim 
took place prior to the ADAAA’s effective date.3
3 For purposes of disposing of this appeal, because the district court 
analyzed Ms. Latham’s NMHRA claim under the pre-amendment ADA, and 
because Ms. Latham contends that the New Mexico Supreme Court would look to 
the ADAAA (rather than the pre-amendment ADA) for guidance, we assume 
without deciding that one of the two ADA standards (either the ADAAA or the 
pre-amendment ADA) would operate as the principal touchstone for the New 
Mexico Supreme Court in addressing the merits of a NMHRA claim.
-9-
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No New Mexico court has addressed this question, so we are making an 
“Erie-guess.” Pehle v. Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co., 397 F.3d 897, 901 (10th Cir. 
2005) (italics added). That is, we must “predict how New Mexico’s highest court 
would rule.” FDIC v. Schuchmann, 235 F.3d 1217, 1225 (10th Cir. 2000); see 
also Wood v. Eli Lilly & Co., 38 F.3d 510, 512 (10th Cir.1994) (explaining that 
the objective is to ascertain and apply state law so that the result obtained is the 
result that would be reached in the state court; a federal court must in essence 
predict how the highest state court would rule).
When making an Erie guess, we are “free to consider all resources 
available, including decisions of [New Mexico] courts, other state courts and 
federal courts, in addition to the general weight and trend of authority.” Stuart v. 
Colo. Interstate Gas Co., 271 F.3d 1221, 1228 (10th Cir. 2001) (emphasis added) 
(quoting Schuchmann, 235 F.3d at 1225) (internal quotation marks omitted); see 
MidAmerica Constr. Mgmt., Inc. v. MasTec N. Am., Inc., 436 F.3d 1257, 1265 
(10th Cir. 2006) (considering “the general weight and trend of authority” in 
discerning how the highest court of the State at issue might rule).
As explicated below, we predict that the New Mexico Supreme Court 
would hold that the ADAAA does not apply retroactively. In brief, the New 
Mexico Supreme Court has looked to federal courts’ decisions for guidance in 
interpreting the NMHRA. And those courts have overwhelmingly adopted the
-10-
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view that the ADAAA does not apply retroactively. Furthermore, were the New 
Mexico Supreme Court to adopt this view, it would be in line with general 
judicial default principles of statutory interpretation endorsed alike by federal and 
New Mexico courts.
2
The ADAAA states, “This Act and the amendments made by this Act shall 
become effective on January 1, 2009.” Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 8, 122 Stat. 3559. 
As its formal title suggests, the ADAAA was intended to “restore the intent and 
protections” of the ADA after the ADA’s reach had been limited by certain 
Supreme Court decisions. Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553. Generally 
speaking, the ADAAA was intended to remove certain constraints on the 
definition of “disability” imposed by the Court’s construction of the ADA. See, 
e.g., Carter v. Pathfinder Energy Servs., Inc., 662 F.3d 1134, 1144 (10th Cir. 
2011) (noting that “Congress amended the ADA in 2008 ‘to correct what it 
viewed as an overly restrictive interpretation of the statute’s terms that had been 
adopted by the Supreme Court’” (quoting Carmona v. Sw. Airlines Co., 604 F.3d 
848, 855 (5th Cir. 2010))); Kemp v. Holder, 610 F.3d 231, 236 (5th Cir. 2010) 
(agreeing with the plaintiff that the ADAAA was intended by Congress to 
abrogate the Supreme Court’s holding that whether an impairment constitutes a 
“disability” must be considered with reference to the “mitigating effects” of
-11-
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health-care aids); Hohider v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 574 F.3d 169, 188 n.17 
(3d Cir. 2009) (“The ADAAA amends the ADA in important respects, particularly 
with regard to the definition and construction of ‘disability’ under the statute.”); 
see also Rhodes v. Langston Univ., 462 F. App’x 773, 776-77 (10th Cir. 2011) 
(discussing congressional intent in enacting the ADAAA); Allen v. SouthCrest 
Hosp., 455 F. App’x 827, 834 (10th Cir. 2011) (same).
However, all events relevant to Ms. Latham’s claim occurred before the 
ADAAA’s enactment in January 1, 2009. “When a case implicates a federal 
statute enacted after the events in suit, the court’s first task is to determine 
whether Congress has expressly prescribed the statute’s proper reach. If Congress 
has done so, of course, there is no need to resort to judicial default rules.” 
Landgraf v. USIFilm Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 280 (1994). Nevertheless, “when the 
Congress has delayed the effective date of a substantive statute that could in 
principle be applied to conduct completed before its enactment,” the federal 
courts “presume the statute applies only prospectively.” Lytes v. DC Water & 
Sewer Auth., 572 F.3d 936, 940 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
In addition to the effective date, default rules of statutory interpretation 
under federal law weigh against retroactive application. As the Supreme Court 
set out in Landgraf:
When . . . the statute contains no . . . express command 
[prescribing its proper reach], the court must determine whether
-12-
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the new statute would have retroactive effect, i.e., whether it 
would impair rights a party possessed when he acted, increase a 
party’s liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with 
respect to transactions already completed. If the statute would 
operate retroactively, our traditional presumption teaches that it 
does not govern absent clear congressional intent favoring such 
a result.
511 U.S. at 280 (emphasis added). Ms. Latham seeks application of the ADAAA 
under her perception that it will expand the scope of APS’s liability. See, e.g., 
Aplt. Opening Br. at 18 (noting that under the ADAAA “Ms. Latham’s condition 
must be considered in the absence of mitigating measures, such as a service dog, 
inhaler, or any treatment.”). APS does not question this view of the statute’s 
effect. See Aplee. Br. at 27 (“[A]pplying the ADAAA to pre-2009 conduct . . . 
would impose, upon APS, liability for actions which were compliant with ADA at 
the time APS took such actions.”). Accordingly, we have no reason to do so. In 
this circumstance, absent clear congressional intent favoring retroactivity, federal 
law would dictate that we presume that the ADAAA does not apply to this case.
3
In interpreting its own Human Rights Act, the New Mexico Supreme Court 
has “indicated that it is appropriate to rely upon federal adjudication for guidance 
in analyzing a claim under the act.” Trujillo v. N. Rio Arriba Electric Co-op,
Inc., 41 P.3d 333, 338 (N.M. 2001). With the caveat that its “reliance on the 
methodology developed in the federal courts . . . should not be interpreted as an
-13-
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indication that [it has] adopted federal law,” id. (quoting Smith v. FDC Corp., 787 
P.2d 433, 436 (N.M. 1990)) (internal quotation marks omitted), the Trujillo court 
noted that for the claim before it, “the closest federal counterpart would be the 
[ADA],” id. The court indicated a willingness to reference not only relevant 
Tenth Circuit precedent, but also the germane precedent of other federal courts. 
See id. at 338-41.
In Wegner v. Hair Products of Texas, a case exploring when statutory 
amendments should be applied retroactively, the New Mexico Court of Appeals 
followed the holding of Landgraf, relying on its proposition that retroactive 
application affecting substantial rights would be improper if such application 
attaches “new legal consequences to events completed before its enactment.”
110 P.3d 544, 548 (N.M. Ct. App. 2005) (citing Landsgraf, 511 U.S. at 270). 
Further, the New Mexico Supreme Court has endorsed the general default rules of 
retroactive statutory application: “[T]he general rule is that statutes apply 
prospectively unless the [legislature manifests clear intent to the contrary,” Gill 
v. Pub. Emps. Ret. Bd. of Pub. Emps. Ret. Ass’n of N.M., 90 P.3d 491, 494 (N.M. 
2004) (quoting Gallegos v. Pueblo of Tesuque, 46 P.3d 668, 680 (N.M. 2002)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).
The New Mexico Supreme Court’s inclination to look to the decisions of 
the federal courts in construing the NMHRA suggests that it would not conclude
-14-
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that the ADAAA should be given retroactive effect. In this regard, although we 
have offered little in the way of supportive reasoning, we have concluded in this 
circuit that the ADAAA does not apply retroactively. Specifically, in Hennagir v. 
Utah Department of Corrections, 587 F.3d 1255, 1261 n.2 (10th Cir. 2009), we 
stated in a footnote, “The ADA has been substantially amended via the ADA 
Amendments Act of 2008. It is unnecessary to consider the effect of those 
changes, given that [plaintiff] was terminated in 2005.” With little more than a 
citation to Hennagir, as apparently controlling authority, we have thereafter taken 
the position that the ADAAA does not operate retroactively. See Carter, 662 
F.3d at 1144 (“Because the ADAAA does not operate retroactively, we apply the 
law as it stood prior to the enactment of the ADAAA.” (citation omitted)); 
Johnson v. Weld Cty., Colo., 594 F.3d 1202, 1217 n.7 (10th Cir. 2010); see also 
Johnson v. Sedgwick Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 461 F. App’x 756, 759 n.2 (10th Cir. 
2012) (“Although this definition has changed with the ADA Amendments Act of 
2008 (ADAAA), we apply the prior definition and interpretive case law because 
Mr. Johnson’s ADA claim arose before the ADAAA’s effective date (January 1, 
2009).”).
This outcome is consistent with the predominant view among federal 
courts. In an unpublished opinion that addresses the ADAAA-retroactivity issue, 
a panel of this court explained that “[t]he overwhelming number of cases 
examining this issue have held that the ADAAA should not be applied
-15-
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retroactively, and all circuit courts have so held,” and noted that “[t]he reasoning 
of these cases is persuasive.”4 Rhodes, 462 F. App’x at 777; see also Lander v. 
ABF Freight Sys., Inc., 459 F. App’x 89, 92 n.2 (3d Cir. 2012) (“All circuits that 
have considered this issue have uniformly concluded that the ADAAA does not 
apply retroactively.”); Lawson v. Plantation Gen. Hosp., L.P., 704 F. Supp. 2d 
1254, 1273 (S.D. Fla. 2010) (collecting cases).
Based on the foregoing, we predict that the New Mexico Supreme Court 
would hold that the ADAAA should not be given retroactive application. The 
New Mexico Supreme has looked to federal precedent in interpreting the ADA for 
guidance in construing NMHRA. See Trujillo, 41 P.3d at 339. And the clear 
“general weight and trend of authority,” Stuart, 235 F.3d at 1225, among federal 
courts is not to apply the ADAAA retroactively, see Rhodes, 462 F. App’x at 777. 
And for the New Mexico Supreme Court to reach such a conclusion would be 
consistent with its apparently general view on the retroactivity question, under 
which statutes are presumed to operate prospectively absent the legislature’s clear 4
4 The panel noted multiple reasons for its ruling, including (1) 
“[C]ongress did not make it clear the ADAAA should be retroactive”; (2) there 
would be “retroactive consequence in the disfavored sense of affecting 
substantive rights, liabilities, or duties on the basis of conduct arising before [the 
ADAAA’s] enactment”; and (3) “the delayed effective date of January 1, 2009 
has no reasonable ‘time-neutral’ alternative explanation other than an intent to 
provide prospective effect and ‘give fair warning of the [ADAAA] to affected 
parties to protect settled expectations.’” Rhodes, 462 F. App’x at 777 (alterations 
in original) (quoting Lytes, 572 F.3d at 940-41).
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manifestation of a contrary intent. See, e.g., Gill, 90 P.3d at 494.5 We therefore 
reject Ms. Latham’s invitation to hold that the New Mexico Supreme Court would 
(in the context of her NMHRA discrimination claim) apply the ADAAA 
retroactively to APS’s 2008 conduct.
5 Our conclusion is arguably bolstered by an examination of the New 
Mexico Human Rights Division’s regulation defining “serious medical condition.” 
As APS notes, see Aplee. Br. at 17-18, the New Mexico Supreme Court has 
looked to the Division’s regulations for guidance in resolving claims under the 
NMHRA. See Trujillo, 41 P.3d at 338; see also Sabella v. Manor Care, Inc., 915 
P.2d 901, 902 n.1 (N.M. 1996). The pertinent regulation states that the 
NMHRA’s “serious medical condition” classification should be taken to mean a 
“serious health-related impairment . . . which substantially limits one or more of 
an individual’s major life activities.” N.M. Code R. 9.1.1.7(GG) (Oct. 1, 2001). 
This definition closely tracks the pre-amendment ADA’s definition of 
“disability.” See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2006) (defining disability as a “physical 
or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major activities 
of such individual”). Significantly, the language of this regulation has not been 
revised to incorporate the changes wrought by the ADAAA. In faithfully 
applying the law of New Mexico in resolving Ms. Latham’s NMHRA claim, it 
seems improbable that the New Mexico Supreme Court would select a federal 
touchstone or guidepost that would evince a significant departure from the current 
state of New Mexico law—as conceived by the agency charged with processing 
claims under the NMHRA—that is, the Division. The ADAAA—but not the pre­
amendment ADA—embodies such a departure.
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III
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.6
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Jerome A. Holmes 
Circuit Judge
6 In light of Ms. Latham’s properly preserved challenges on appeal, we 
have no occasion to opine on whether Ms. Latham actually is “disabled” under 
any standard of the ADA, or whether she has a “serious medical condition” for 
purposes of New Mexico law.
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